Trauma Informed Training: The Key To Preventing Sexual Violence in the ADF

Jordyn Gray, The Menzies Leadership Foundation, Commission on the Status of Women 2025

Executive Summary

Sexual violence remains a systemic issue within the Australian Defence Force (ADF), causing lasting harm to victim-survivors, eroding public trust, and weakening operational capability. Despite decades of inquiries and internal reviews, Defence continues to fall short in delivering appropriate support, timely accountability, and a safe reporting environment. This failure not only undermines the wellbeing of ADF members but also significantly hampers recruitment and retention across the broader organisation.

This policy paper recommends a threefold approach to address these longstanding failures: the introduction of mandatory trauma-informed leadership training across all ranks; the expansion of on-base specialist response officers (SVROs) to ensure consistent, survivor-centric support; and the implementation of an anonymous digital data collection tool to monitor experiences, identify systemic trends, and inform continuous cultural reform. Together, these reforms prioritise lived experience, expert partnership, and evidence-based intervention.

The proposed model would require an estimated $4.5–6 million over three years, delivered through existing Australian Defence Force (ADF) wellbeing and capability budgets. Oversight and implementation would sit with Joint Support Services Division and Joint Military Police Command, with delivery partners including internal and external specialist sexual violence services. While challenges such as cultural resistance and operational complexity must be addressed, the cost of inaction is far greater. These reforms present a practical, trauma-informed pathway to restore trust, improve outcomes for survivors, and rebuild Defence’s credibility from within.

Problem Identification

Experiences of sexual violence and harassment within the Australian Defence Force are estimated to be underreported by upwards of 60% due to systemic barriers, including fear of retaliation, lack of trust in leadership, and inadequate reporting mechanisms (The Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide [RCIDVS], 2024). The ADF lacks a robust and anonymous data collection system to capture the true scale of sexual misconduct, preventing effective intervention. While there were 800 formal reports of sexual assault recorded between 2019 and 2024, a confirmed underreporting rate indicates the true scale to be much higher (RCIDVS, 2024). Without reform, survivors will continue to face inadequate support and limited access to justice, resulting in prolonged psychological harm, reduced workforce participation, and lifelong health impacts. Defence will remain structurally constrained in its ability to respond effectively, allowing harmful conduct to persist and undermining morale and unit cohesion. Operational capability will be weakened as trust within the chain of command deteriorates and experienced personnel disengage or separate. Public confidence in Defence will continue to erode, further compounding recruitment and retention pressures in an environment already shaped by documented cultural and systemic failures.

Context

Despite repeated reform efforts, the ADF’s current sexual violence response system remains culturally unsafe, inconsistent, and limited in effectiveness. Existing policies, including The Sexual Misconduct Prevention and Response Office (1800SeMPRO), command-led case management, restricted and unrestricted reporting pathways, and annual workforce surveys, have not achieved meaningful improvements in survivor safety or reporting confidence (RCIDVS, 2024). A key gap is the lack of trauma-informed capability across leadership. Most supervisors are untrained in responding to disclosures, which contributes to re-traumatisation, procedural errors, and early withdrawal from support options (RCIDVS, 2024).

1800SeMPRO is an entity within the ADF Support Services Division. It is intended to provide confidential advice to survivors and their chains of command, support and facilitate referrals, and provide policy guidance in matters of sexual violence. However, it operates outside the chain of command and holds no authority to direct investigations, influence administrative outcomes, or ensure protective measures are implemented. Discussions in Senate Estimates confirmed it receives fewer than 15 calls per month across the entire ADF, demonstrating low engagement and limited trust (APH Senate Estimates, 2023).

Underreporting persists because Defence’s internal monitoring tools, such as the Defence Census and Workplace Behaviour Surveys, are not viewed as confidential by members (RCIDVS, 2024). Although anonymised in design, demographic questions like rank, gender, and base location allow individuals to be identified within small units. Personnel have described fears of command repercussions when survey results are discussed at unit level, which discourages participation in formal reporting and feedback processes (RCIDVS, 2024; IGADF, 2022). This reflects broader issues of cultural safety, particularly for women and gender-diverse members, where organisational loyalty and reputation are often prioritised above survivor wellbeing (DVA, 2023; Jenkins, 2021). The Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide (The Royal Commission) made clear that these barriers are not matters of perception but are embedded structural risks within Defence systems (RCIDVS, 2024).

A key limitation of Defence’s current monitoring tools is the lack of truly anonymous reporting, which prevents survivors from disclosing incidents safely and results in an incomplete understanding of sexual violence across the organisation. Models such as She’s A Crowd demonstrate the effectiveness of survivor‑centred, fully anonymised reporting platforms. This system allows individuals to submit detailed accounts of harassment or assault while retaining complete control over what information is shared, including whether to provide identifying or location data (Australian Red Cross Humanitech, 2024). Reports are manually reviewed and de‑identified, generating aggregated data that can reveal systemic trends and inform policy without compromising individual safety. Adopting a similar model within the ADF would fill a critical gap by providing a safe avenue for disclosure, enabling evidence‑based insights into the prevalence and nature of sexual violence, and guiding targeted cultural and structural reforms.

Although the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) has expanded access to trauma-related mental health services, these supports are often accessed only after members have separated from service due to unresolved incidents within Defence. Nearly 30% of female veterans seeking DVA mental health assistance identify sexual trauma as a key contributing factor (DVA, 2023). This pattern demonstrates a systemic failure in early intervention within the ADF and shifts the long-term burden to the ex-service organisation sector.

International models highlight the importance of structural independence from the chain of command. In the United States, full-time Sexual Assault Response Coordinators operate outside operational reporting lines and provide confidential, specialist support, reducing perceived conflicts of interest and improving reporting confidence (DoD, 2023). Similarly, Canada established an external oversight body following findings that internal mechanisms were compromised by command influence and cultural bias (Deschamps, 2015; National Defence Canada, 2022). These models demonstrate that independence is valuable not simply because it is external, but because it mitigates power imbalances, reduces fear of reprisal, and strengthens procedural integrity.

Over more than a decade of reviews, including the Broderick Review (2012), multiple IGADF inquiries, and the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, several key recommendations have been only partially implemented or remain unaddressed.

These include; 

• specific reforms on sexual violence, such as commissioning independent prevalence research (Recommendation 14), 

• clarifying definitions and processes for sexual offences (Recommendation 15), 

• mandating sexual misconduct training for leaders (Recommendation 16), 

• strengthening workplace protections (Recommendation 18), 

• publishing anonymised data on outcomes (Recommendation 24), 

• and conducting an independent inquiry into military sexual violence (Recommendation 25) (RCIDVS, 2024). 

  
  

The Royal Commission concluded that unsafe reporting structures, command-controlled decision making, and the lack of trained, embedded response professionals allow underreporting to persist and continue to cause harm (RCIDVS, 2024). Systemic change is required to resolve these structural failings, rather than further expansion of current policy mechanisms.

Policy Options

To create lasting cultural change and improve outcomes for survivors, the ADF must embed trauma-informed, victim-centric response mechanisms across all levels of leadership. Addressing systemic barriers that deter reporting, strengthening survivor support through specialised training, and ensuring accountability with more effective response structures are critical to this reform. The following options outline potential approaches to implementing these changes. 

Option 1: Mandated Trauma-Informed Leadership Training

Recommendation

All commissioned officers and senior non-commissioned officers (CPL and above) should be mandated to complete externally delivered trauma-informed leadership training. Delivery should occur through formal partnerships with external organisations and academic programs with recognised expertise, such as Full Stop Australia and Australian university programs in Gender, Peace, and Security. Engaging external providers ensures training remains independent from internal Defence pressures and aligns with contemporary best-practice standards. Programs should meet professional education standards regulated by the Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA) or relevant tertiary regulators.

Implementation and Cost

Training would be compulsory for all specified ranks, with completion tied to PMKeyS (Defence’s personnel management system used to track qualifications), postings, and training history. Completion would also be linked to promotion, command-readiness, and annual performance reviews. Initial funding of approximately $3 million over three years is required for national rollout, based on trauma-informed training programs in healthcare and emergency services (Flynn & Kautz, 2020; Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare, 2020; Australian Skills Quality Authority, 2021; Australian Public Service Commission, 2022). Funding could be sourced from reallocated Defence professional development budgets, with supplementary Commonwealth support for initial implementation.

Measuring Success

Success will be measured through increased disclosures, improvements in leadership knowledge, and survivor satisfaction. Regular audits will track compliance and the impact of training on Defence culture.

Option 2:  Specialist Sexual Violence Response Officer (SVRO) Program

Recommendation

Replace the current 1800SEMPRO model with a Specialist Sexual Violence Response Officer (SVRO) Program, where dedicated, trauma-trained professionals are embedded on ADF bases to act as the first point of contact for disclosures, providing immediate support, risk assessment, and ongoing advocacy for victim-survivors. Unlike SeMPRO’s centralised phone service, SVROs would operate in-person as accessible, trauma-informed first responders. They would operate entirely outside the rank and command structure, providing confidential guidance, advocacy, and referral support at the earliest stage of disclosure. This independence shifts power dynamics by offering survivors a neutral option before entering formal investigative processes. SVROs would report through an independent Defence People Group structure, with annual public reporting on utilisation and outcomes.

Implementation and Cost

This program would expand and redirect resources from the Sexual Offence Response Team (SORT) within Joint Military Police Units. Training and additional staffing would cover all ADF bases, with estimated initial funding of $1.5–2 million annually. Funding would also support collaboration with ex-service organisations to extend survivor support.

Measuring Success

Success will be evaluated by survivor engagement, improvements in reporting and response times, and survivor feedback. Reports will be submitted to the Independent Survivor Advocacy and Reform Directorate for oversight and continuous improvement.

Option 3:  Anonymous Data Collection and Reporting System

Recommendation

Integrate a fully anonymous, trauma-informed reporting platform based on the She’s A Crowd model to address the critical gap in Defence’s current data collection and reporting systems. This platform would allow survivors to disclose experiences without providing identifying details, directly responding to Royal Commission findings that fear of reprisal and lack of confidentiality drive underreporting (RCIDVS, 2024).

This reform aligns with Recommendation 14 to improve prevalence data and Recommendation 24 to publish anonymised outcomes, by enabling the collection of de-identified, real-time data on the nature and extent of sexual violence within Defence. This would provide a more accurate evidence base to inform targeted prevention strategies, resource allocation, and policy reform, while strengthening survivor safety and reporting confidence.

Implementation and Cost

Estimated development and integration costs are $1.2 million over two years, with ongoing maintenance at approximately $250,000 annually. This estimate is based on comparable government digital service delivery projects and secure data platform builds, which typically range from $500,000 to $1.5 million depending on scale, security requirements, and integration complexity (Australian Government Digital Transformation Agency, 2021; Australian National Audit Office, 2022). Defence Digital Group would manage the tool, with oversight from external survivor experts to ensure integrity.

Measuring Success

Effectiveness will be measured by the volume and quality of reports, use of data for policy and resource allocation, and aggregated insights informing cultural and structural reforms.

Governance, Oversight and Funding

Responsibility for implementing reforms lies with the Department of Defence, in collaboration with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs and external organisations. Governance would sit with an Independent Survivor Advocacy and Reform Directorate within Defence, tasked with compliance, monitoring, and evaluation. Initial investment is approximately $6 million, with annual ongoing funding of $2.5 million for leadership training, the SVRO Program, and the anonymous reporting platform. Long-term success will be measured through reporting rates, survivor satisfaction, and cultural change.

Legislative Amendments

Amendments to the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, the Complaints and Resolutions Manual (CARM), and relevant training directives are required to formalise trauma-informed, victim-centric practices. These changes would embed mandatory training, integrate SVROs into unit support, and enable anonymous reporting for evidence-based policy. For example, CARM could grant SVROs authority to advise command on protective measures, and training directives could link completion to promotion and performance reviews. This ensures the training is mandated and becomes standard practice rather than a perfunctory module.

Implementation and Barriers

Implementing trauma-informed leadership training, expanding on-base specialist support, and deploying a digital reporting tool within Defence presents several technical and operational challenges. Workforce shortages, particularly in regional or remote locations, may affect rollout, while digital infrastructure limitations could restrict access to the reporting tool.Partnerships with organisations such as Full Stop Australia would support implementation through accredited training delivery, workforce capability development, and specialist advisory support, particularly in locations where Defence lacks in-house trauma-informed expertise. Importantly, engaging external specialist organisations also strengthens credibility and transparency, demonstrating a clear shift away from internally managed responses that have historically failed to build trust among survivors. In the context of significant public scrutiny and well-documented accounts of systemic harm, external partnerships signal a commitment to accountability and are critical to rebuilding confidence in Defence’s response to sexual violence.

Culturally, entrenched attitudes, command power structures, and a history of performative reform may impede uptake. Politically, external oversight and collaboration with civilian services may face resistance from those prioritising institutional independence. Socially, renewed focus on sexual violence may initially deter recruits, but transparency and survivor-centred policy are more likely to rebuild trust. Economically, while the policy is costed as a minimum viable product, sustained government commitment is required for long-term success.

The greater risk lies in inaction, prolonging harm to survivors, entrenching distrust, and allowing a culture that continues to weaken Defence from within. Implementing these reforms is critical to ensuring survivor safety, restoring trust, and strengthening Defence from the ground up.

References

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Australian Government Digital Transformation Agency. (2021). Digital service standard and cost modelling guidance. Australian Government. https://www.digital.gov.au/policy/digital-experience/digital-service-standard

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