Sovereign Ties- First Nations and The Pacific

Alex Blackborough - Griffith University

Executive Summary 

The Australian Government prioritises building strong ties in the Pacific, setting aside $1.9b for expenditure in the region in the 2023-24 Budget. Additionally, Australian foreign policy seeks to incorporate First Nations perspectives and is currently enacting policy to achieve these aims, partly in recognition of cultural affinity with Pacific Islander people. 

However, the existing suite of policies do not currently provide explicit mechanisms for Pacific Islander feedback or relationship building regarding foreign policy.

This paper recommends the development of an Australia Pacific Foreign Policy Council to act as a direct means for First Nations representatives to engage with and advise foreign policy development conducted by the Office of the Pacific. The Council will consist of elected Aboriginal members from current advisory bodies existing in the ACT, QLD, SA and Victoria. The Council’s purpose will be to produce a bi-annual report providing advice on current Australian policy, incorporating First Nations perspectives. 

This paper also recommends First Nations specific roles to be implemented at each overseas diplomatic station in the Pacific for consultative purposes on current Pacific-facing Australian foreign policy. 

Problem Identification

Australia views itself as an integrated and active member of the Pacific region and seeks to support a strong and unified Pacific family (Wong, 2022b).  The existing policy suite does not, however, deliver explicit mechanisms designed to foster relationship building and a cross-cultural understanding between Australia, First Australians, and the ‘Pacific family’.

Members of the Pacific do not feel heard or understood in Australia’s current foreign policy landscape (Cain, Cox, & Presterudstuen, 2020). This reinforcement of Australia’s paternalistic status has been identified as harming policy effectiveness and masking a lack of alignment between Pacific priorities and domestic policy (Moore, 2024).  Australia’s current approach in the region focuses on enacting programs without the Pacific’s active participation (Cain et al., 2020). These include those established with allies, including the US-led ‘Partners in the Blue Pacific', characterised by some in the Pacific as “riding roughshod over our institutions and arrangements” and, “without our consultation” (Taylor, 2023). AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership for regional security, is also perceived by some members of the Pacific community to pay little heed to the “Pacific’s long-standing opposition to militarisation” (Taylor, 2023). This feedback demands value-driven approaches to Australia’s foreign policy in the Pacific. 

In addition to a lack of consultation, a cultural relationship between many Pacific Islanders and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders was found to exist, alongside a desire to increase direct engagement between them (Cain et al., 2020). The treatment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders by Australian policy is seen as emblematic of how Australia operates in the region (Cain et al., 2020). Pacific leaders have characterised the outcome of the recent referendum as reflective of an ‘us and them’ binary approach to policy, which may have repercussions for the effectiveness of ongoing work in the region (Ravulo, 2023). 

Context

Pacific Foreign Policy 

Australia seeks to build connections in the Pacific by continuing to ‘Step-Up’ its policy and ambition in the region, listed as one of its top foreign policy priorities (DFAT, 2019). Malcolm Turnbull identified the focus of this push as being on “freedom, democracy, the rule of law [and] mutual respect” while ensuring projects were reflective of Pacific Islander’s self-identified needs (Jacobs, 2023). 

Key priorities include strengthening climate and disaster resilience, education, and gender equality (Wong, 2022b).  In the 2023-2024 budget, the Australian Government allocated $1.9b over five years to enhancing Pacific engagement (Keene, 2023). $89.5m is earmarked for deepening Pacific connections and is designed to improve access to Australian media and invest in education and social protection systems in the region (Keene, 2023). 

In accordance with these aims, Australia has enacted several key pieces of foreign policy targeted at the Pacific region including:

·      The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus 

·      Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific

·      The Office of the Pacific

Australia also engages with regional bodies including: 

·      The Pacific Islands Forum

·      The Pacific Community

·      The Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific

·      Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP)

·      The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency

Appendix 1 highlights the existence of a broad suite of policy as part of the Pacific Step-Up initiatives. 

First Nations international Engagement

In 2022, Foreign Minister Penny Wong stated her commitment to making First Nations voices central to Australian foreign policy (Wong, 2022a). The nature of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander diplomacy has been described as relationalism; an approach reflecting the globalisation of today’s society and acknowledging the interconnectedness of challenges facing sovereign siloed nation states (Graham & Brigg, 2023). This prioritisation of relationship building holds parallels reflective of Pacific approaches to diplomacy where relationships are the currency of influence (Derek Futaiasi, Priestley Habru, Maima Koro, William Waqavakatoga, & McNeill, 2023).

For First Australians, it is an opportunity to independently engage with the region. In addition to this, many Pacific Islands are post-colonial states and recognise elements of custom alongside Western systems of law. This perspective may be valuable as Indigenous Australians strive towards self-determination and greater influence in Australian society. 

Case Studies: Australia

The Office of the Pacific’s (OTP) Indigenous Engagement Plan (IEP) 2021-2023 recognises the deep resonation between Indigenous Australian and Pacific Islander cultures (OTP, 2021). It established a Cultural Working Group in 2021, consisting of members from the OTP, an Indigenous Liaison Officer, Divisional/Regional Champions selected by OTP division heads and a representative from the Indigenous Employee Network (OTP, 2021). The Cultural Working Group meets quarterly to provide advice on the objectives of the IEP which include: embedding First Nations business and perspectives in the Pacific Step-Up, increased employment of First Nations people in the OTP and at overseas diplomatic posts, and strengthening of existing staff cultural competency (OTP, 2021). The IEP was due to be reviewed in 2022, however, the results were not made publicly available. 

In December 2023, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) established the Office for First Nations International Engagement (OFNIE) to embed First Nations perspectives in foreign policy and enhance collaboration across the Indo-Pacific (DFAT, 2023). The commitment includes $13.6m over four years and focuses on identifying areas of cooperation between First Nations people and international partners in intellectual property and exports, climate change, tourism and development (DFAT, 2023).  The OFNIE will include the piloting of a First Nations trade and investment advisory group (DFAT, 2023). The effectiveness of this pilot over the coming years should be closely monitored. 

State-level advisory bodies exist in four of Australia’s states and territories and provide existing models of First Australian consultation in government policy. The Victorian Government has budgeted $138.2m in expenditure over four years for progress towards a treaty which includes the establishment of the advisory authority (Connolly, McGowan, Galea, Hamer, & Hilakari, 2023). 

Table 1: State Advisory Bodies 

State	Authority	Purview	Member Election
ACT	The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Elected Body	Represent the interests of Indigenous people on policy development.	Indigenous representatives are elected every three years by Indigenous voters in the ACT.
QLD	The Torres Strait Regional Authority.	Make decisions on the “strategic vision, policies and budget allocations” of the TSRA.	Twenty Indigenous representatives are elected to the TSRA board by their respective communities every four years.
SA	First Nations Voice to Parliament	Indigenous representatives will be asked to present their views and priorities to the South Australian parliament, ministers and chief executives.	46 members elected by First Nations people in each region make up the Local First Nations Voice. Each region’s Local First Nations Voice selects two presiding members to sit on the State Voice.
Vic	The First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria	Overseeing the Treaty process between Traditional Owners and the Victorian government.	Thirty-two Indigenous representatives are elected to this body, which is organised into regional groupings, with 11 dedicated seats for Traditional Owners. To be eligible to vote in assembly elections, First Nations people need to be at least 16 years old and to have lived in Victoria for at least three of the last five years.

(Stanford, 2023)

Case Study: International

New Zealand consistently embeds Māori cultural practices in its approach to foreign relations (Smith & Holster, 2023). New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Maori women herself, Nanaia Mahuta, explicitly outlined Māori customs that would underscore New Zealand’s values based approach to foreign policy including Manaakitanga (concept of hospitality), Whanaungatanga (word for kinship), Mahi tahi (phrase for collaboration) and Kaitiakitanga (word for guardianship or stewardship) (Smith & Holster, 2023). New Zealand also includes a ‘Treaty of Waitangi exception clause’ in any free-trade agreement (FTA) signed by New Zealand with another country to protect the ‘government’s ability to adopt policies that fulfil its obligations to Māori’ (Smith & Holster, 2023). 

Options

To increase trust and strengthen the relationship between Australia and the Pacific, and for policy that is adaptive to Pacific feedback, the Office of the Pacific must establish an opportunity for direct engagement between First Australians, Australian South Sea Islander peoples and key Pacific leaders as chosen by those member states. There are several policy options that may achieve this: 

1.             The ‘Australia Pacific Foreign Policy Council’ 

The Australia Pacific Foreign Policy Council would be formed under the existing Office for First Nations International Engagement. The Ambassador for First Nations People, Mr Justin Mohammed, would invite existing state and territory advisory bodies in Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory to select two presiding members from the existing members. 

The Council’s role would be to advise on aspects of Australian foreign policy in the Pacific Region. The Council should meet bi-annually with the Deputy Secretary Head of the OTP and each of the Division leaders in the Office of the Pacific including the Pacific Strategy Division, the Melanesia Division, the Pacific Integration Division, the Polynesia, Micronesia and Development Division and the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP). Each quarter, the Council will produce a ‘Review’ targeted at responding to and advising on proposed government policy in the region. The review should be considered by the division of the OTP developing the reviewed policy. 

2.             Create the Role of ‘Regional Deputy Ambassadors for First Nations People’ 

Regional expertise and ongoing relationship building is paramount for Pacific and First Australian diplomacy. DFAT has recently introduced the inaugural Ambassador for First Nations People, Mr Justin Mohammed. To support this role, DFAT should select Regional Deputy Ambassadors for First Nations People. The process for selection will follow the selection of the current Ambassador for First Nations People. It will include a call for an expression of interest before selection by a panel consisting of the current Ambassador for First Nations People, the Minister for Indigenous Australians, senior government officials and Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander representatives (DFAT, 2022). 

The Deputy Ambassadors should be embedded in each of the DFAT Groups ensuring ongoing engagement with policy development and diplomatic outreach. These groups are the Office of the Pacific, the South and Southeast Asia Group, Strategic Planning and Coordination Group (SCG), Trade and Investment Group (TIG), Development, Multilateral and Europe Group (DMG), International Security, Legal and Consular Group (ISG) and the Enabling Services Group (ESG). Deputy Ambassadors will attend international summits such as those run by the Quad and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 

3.             Expand Objective 2 of the Indigenous Engagement Plan to include a designated position for First Nations staff at overseas posts 

The IEP should be reviewed by the Office for First Nations International Engagement in 2024. The $13.6m in funding is currently being used in business and investment-focussed initiatives (DFAT, 2023). 

Objective 2 of the IEP seeks to increase indigenous representation in the OTP and at overseas posts by encouraging rotations through these posts and promoting indigenous recruitment drives (OTP, 2021). However, this measure in isolation does not ensure that the roles for indigenous representatives includes meaningful engagement with communities while at these posts. The Office for First Nations International Engagement should implement a designated First Nations role within each diplomatic post, selected from internal First Nations candidates. 

The role will be focussed on receiving feedback on existing Australian foreign policy from community members via bi-annual public calls for consultations regarding specific regional policies. Consultations will take the form of submissions from affected community groups. The indigenous representative will be tasked with collating this feedback bi-annually to be shared with the Division Heads of the OTP. 

Policy Recommendation

It is recommended the Australian government implement Option 1, the ‘Australian Pacific Foreign Policy Council’ (the Council, idea developed after case study analysis and discussions with Dr Tess Newton Cain)). For enhanced efficacy, this should be combined with the recommendations in Option 3 for engagement with overseas stations. 

Structure

The Council will operate as a sub-group of the Office for First Nations International Engagement. The Ambassador for First Nations People will initiate formation of the Council by inviting existing state and territory advisory bodies to nominate two presiding members from their existing members. The nominated members will form the Council and will undertake their duties as part of their existing advisory capacities. 

If advisory bodies are formed in the Northern Territory, Western Australia or Tasmania, the Council would include one presiding member from each advisory body to ensure the number of representatives does not exceed ten members or decrease below four members. 

It is also recommended that the OTP create a position at each overseas post to be filled by a First Nations employee from DFAT. The role is primarily for the establishment of ongoing relationships between First Nations people and the Pacific Region. It will require coordination of bi-annual calls for community submissions regarding specific Australian foreign policy initiatives in the region. The First Nations representative will be primarily focussed on holding relationship building community consultations and will share submissions with the Council. 

Terms of Reference

The Council will meet bi-annually with the Deputy Secretary Head of the OTP and each of the Division leaders in the OTP including the Pacific Strategy Division, the Melanesia Division, the Pacific Integration Division, the Polynesia, Micronesia and Development Division and the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP). New policy proposals impacting the Pacific region will be tabled during the bi-annual meetings and each quarter the Council will produce a ‘Report’ targeted at responding to and advising on these proposals. The report will be submitted to the Division Heads of the OTP developing the reviewed policy three months after the bi-annual meeting. 

It is the duty of the Division Heads to provide a response to each Report addressing each of the recommendations prior to the next bi-annual meeting. Recommendations do not have to be accepted. New policy proposals must only be tabled once for the Council to consider except in circumstances where significant changes to the form and structure of the proposal have occurred; in which case they will be resubmitted for review at the following bi-annual meeting. 

The Council will incorporate the results of overseas consultation into the Reports produced for bi-annual meetings. 

Costs

Externally posted representatives would be at least APS Level 6, having completed their graduate training program, and would require salaries of $95k-$107k per annum (DFAT, 2024). Assuming each of the 13 diplomatic stations in the Pacific includes one First Nations representative, this will cost $1.235M-$1.391M annually.

Council members will be paid as external consultants for their advisory work. This aligns with government policy approving outsourcing to peak bodies (Commission, 2023). Policy consultant salaries for members of the Prime Minister’s Indigenous Advisory Council use a daily fee; based on surrounding consultant salaries this is likely to amount to a yearly sum for full time work of $41 480 for members and $82 960 for the chair (Office of Parliamentary Counsel, 2023). At the maximum of ten representatives this would incur a yearly fee of approximately $456k for the entire council.

The maximum total cost of the recommendation will amount to approximately $1.85M. This estimate does not account for additional time required by existing members of the OTP to produce responses to Reports or to conduct bi-annual meetings. 

The expenditure for the Council will be sourced from:

·      $114.3M of the 2023-24 Budget currently set aside for Pacific Regional Unity. Key components of this include supporting regional architecture and diplomatic capability. 

The development of a Council will contribute to meaningful spending in each of these areas and strengthen regional architecture, aligning with existing budget priorities and government spending.

Limitations

This proposal has been developed without extensive First Nations consultation and was conducted by a Western author trained in an academic setting focussed on Western pedagogy (Krusz et al., 2019). It is likely to contain unconscious biases and should only be implemented after more rigorous consultative processes. 

The proposal relies on the participation of state advisory bodies and First Nations DFAT employees accepting foreign postings. Participation may not occur, in which case the proposal will need to consider alternative constructions of the Council and of overseas postings. Additionally, the proposal uses case studies that are yet to be reviewed in terms of their effectiveness. If and when these are reviewed publicly, they should be used to adjust the proposal. 

Not all states contain an advisory body, nor are they all state-wide bodies. This limits the representation of First Nations perspectives. Furthermore, the effectiveness of using state and territory representatives to advise on foreign policy is yet to be established. 

Recommendations produced by the Council may not be adequately implemented and may be treated as a ‘tick box’ exercise. Additionally, the consultative process to be undertaken at overseas postings is novel. Case studies where this has occurred could not be found. Formal channels for foreign bodies to comment on Australian policy could blur concepts of sovereignty and may be challenging to accept for members of the Australian public. 

References

Cain, T. N., Cox, J., & Presterudstuen, G. H. (2020). Pacific perspectives on the world: Whitlam Institute.

Commission, A. P. S. (2023, 1 December 2023). Outsourcing (in limited circumstances). Australian Public Services Commission. Retrieved from https://www.apsc.gov.au/initiatives-and-programs/workforce-information/aps-strategic-commissioning-framework/resources-toolkit-strategic-commissioning-framework/outsourcing-limited-circumstances

Connolly, S., McGowan, N., Galea, M., Hamer, P., & Hilakari, M. (2023, 7 June 2023). Inquiry into the 2023-24 Budget Estimates. Parliament of Victoria. Retrieved from https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/be2023-24

Derek Futaiasi, Priestley Habru, Maima Koro, William Waqavakatoga, & McNeill, H. (2023). Relationships are the Enduring Currency of Influence for the Pacific Islands. Australian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/relationships-are-the-enduring-currency-of-influence-for-the-pacific-islands/

DFAT. (2019, September 2019). Stepping Up Australia’s Engagement with our Pacific Family. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/stepping-up-australias-engagement-with-our-pacific-family.pdf

DFAT. (2022). Expression of Interest Australia’s Ambassador for First Nations People. Autralian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved from https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/australia-ambassador-first-nations-people.pdf

DFAT. (2023, 21 December 2023). Establishment of the Office for First Nations International Engagement. Retrieved from https://www.dfat.gov.au/news/media-release/establishment-office-first-nations-international-engagement

DFAT. (2024, 2024). Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Enterprise Agreement. Retrieved from https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/dfat-enterprise-agreement-2024.docx

Graham, M., & Brigg, M. (2023). Indigenous international relations: old peoples and new pragmatism. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 77(6), 590. doi:10.1080/10357718.2023.2265847

Jacobs, S. (2023, 7 November 2023). Shared values: Pacific-led regionalism in the age of great power competition | Part 1. Griffith Asia Insights. Retrieved from https://blogs.griffith.edu.au/asiainsights/shared-values-pacific-led-regionalism-in-the-age-of-great-power-competition-part-1/

Krusz E, Nona F, Ferguson M, Charlton K, Angus L, Thomas P, Fredericks B (2022). Toolkit for Embedding Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Knowledges in UQ’s School of Public Health Curriculum. University of Queensland. 

Keene, M. (2023, May 2023). Overseas aid and the Pacific investment package. Parliament of Australia.Retrieved from https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_departments/Parliamentary_Library/Budget/reviews/2023-24/Overseas_aid_and_the_Pacific_investment_package#:~:text=Pacific%20peace%20and%20security%20–%20%241.4,Deepening%20Pacific%20connections%20–%20%2489.5%20million.

Moore, L. (2024). A Dysfunctional Family: How Australia Can and Should Repair its Relationships with the Pacific by Acting on Climate. Australian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/a-dysfunctional-family-how-australia-can-and-should-repair-its-relationships-with-the-pacific-by-acting-on-climate/

Office of Parliamentary Counsel. (2023, 24 April 2024). Remuneration Tribunal (Remuneration and Allowances for Holders of Part-time Public Office) Determination (No. 2) 2023. Retrieved from https://www.remtribunal.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-05/PTO%202023%20No.%202%20-%20Compilation%20No.%205.pdf 

OTP. (2021). Indigenous Engagement Plan 2021-2023. Policy Brief: Office of the Pacific. Retrieved from https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/office-pacific-indigenous-engagement-plan-2021-23.pdf

Ravulo, J. (2023). Why the Voice vote matters in the Pacific. 360info. Retrieved from https://360info.org/why-the-voice-vote-matters-in-the-pacific/

Smith, N. R., & Holster, B. (2023). New Zealand's ‘Maori foreign policy’ and China: a case of instrumental relationality? International Affairs, 99(4), 1575. doi:10.1093/ia/iiad123

Stanford, B. (2023). Some states already have Indigenous advisory bodies. What are they, and how would the Voice be different? The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/some-states-already-have-indigenous-advisory-bodies-what-are-they-and-how-would-the-voice-be-different-214726

Taylor, D. M. (2023). Pacific-led Regionalism Undermined. Asia Society Policy Institute. Retrieved from https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/pacific-led-regionalism-undermined

Wong, S. t. H. P. (2022a, 23 September 2022). National Statement to the UN General Assembly Minister for Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/national-statement-united-nations-general-assembly

Wong, S. t. H. P. (2022b, 26 May 2022). Speech to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Minister for Foreign Affairs.Retrieved from https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/penny-wong/speech/speech-pacific-islands-forum-secretariat

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