Universal Jurisdiction: Strengthening Australia’s Participation in International Criminal Justice

Samar Batool Athar, Menzies Leadership Foundation, UNGA Fellow 2025

Executive Summary

How should Australian authorities respond when alleged perpetrators of serious international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture are present on our territory?

Australia has long recognised the international criminal law principle of universal jurisdiction. Yet, despite incorporating this principle into the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Australian authorities have consistently failed to investigate or prosecute alleged international criminals residing in Australia. This failure stems from two main causes: (i) the Attorney-General’s unfettered (political) discretion to pursue or block prosecutions; and (ii) the absence of specialised institutional capacity to investigate international crimes. As a result, Australia risks breaching its international treaty obligations, undermining its reputation of ‘good international citizenship’, and threatening the security of victim-survivor communities.

To address these deficiencies, this proposal recommends establishing a permanent specialised federal investigatory unit for international crimes within the Attorney-General’s portfolio. This independent agency would investigate alleged perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture under Divisions 268 and 274 of the Criminal Code Act. Modelled on successful institutional mechanisms around the world – and drawing lessons from Australia’s own ad hoc international crimes investigations – this unit will strengthen Australia’s investigative capabilities, ensure accountability, and reinforce our global commitment to ending impunity. 

Problem Identification

Australia recognises universal jurisdiction as ‘a fundamental principle of international law’ (Russell, 2024). This principle enables states to assert their domestic criminal jurisdiction over perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern, regardless of the location of perpetration, or the nationality of the perpetrator or victims (Lagerwall and Hébert-Dolbec, 2022), because such perpetrators are considered ‘hostis humani generis’, or enemies of all mankind (Hall, 2023). In line with its international treaty obligations, Australia has embedded universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture into domestic legislation (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 268.117(1), 274.2(5)). Yet despite Australia acknowledging at the global stage its responsibility to ensure these crimes do not go unpunished (Gawthorne, 2025), federal authorities have frequently failed to utilise universal jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of international crimes when present in Australia (Keene-McCann and Jayakody, 2025; Athar, 2026). 

Causes for these failures are two-fold. First, there appears to be limited political appetite to conduct these prosecutions and seek accountability, noting that the Commonwealth Attorney-General has unfettered discretion on whether to initiate proceedings for international crimes (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 16.1, 268.121–268.122). Secondly, there is a lacuna in current mechanisms for prosecuting or investigating international crimes, and authorities such as the Australian Federal Police (‘AFP’) are institutionally unequipped to deal with the complexities of international crimes and carry out arrests (Doherty, 2024).

By not exercising universal jurisdiction, Australia is at risk of violating:

1. its treaty obligations to prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators of torture (Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 art 7(1))

2. its treaty obligations to prevent and punish genocide (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 art 1)

3. its treaty obligations to search for alleged perpetrators of grave breaches of international humanitarian law, and to try them before domestic courts (Geneva Conventions of 1949 – see eg, Convention (I) art 49)

4. its customary international law obligation to investigate war crimes falling within its jurisdiction (International Committee of the Red Cross, r 158)

5. its international obligations to provide mutual legal assistance and extradition for international crime cooperation, and

6. victim-survivor communities’ human right to an effective remedy (United Nations General Assembly, 2005).

As a state party to the Rome Statute, Australia also recognises that it is ‘the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 preamble).

Although direct sanctions or legal ramifications for these violations are unlikely in the present geopolitical climate, they nonetheless abrogate Australia’s national interest of advancing peace and security in the face of atrocity crimes. Australia ordinarily plays an outsized role in the development and promotion of international law, both regionally and globally, and these failures represent a departure from Australia’s usual ‘good international citizenship’ (Fullilove, 2022).

It is within Australia’s national interest, and consistent with its international positionality, to ensure it is not a ‘safe haven’ for international criminals. In addition to the moral imperative of achieving justice for victims, such measures are necessary for promoting public trust in Australia’s commitment to anti-impunity for international crimes. Upholding international law will also provide Australia a significant reputational and diplomatic advantage, which can translate to soft power in international relations, supporting Australia’s security and economic interests. This includes supporting Australia’s campaign for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2029–2030 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.) and ensuring continual Australian representation in the International Court of Justice judiciary. 

Context

International Practice

Internationally, assertions of universal jurisdiction are in a phase of revival (Langer and Eason, 2019). In 2025, TRIAL International identified over 160 universal jurisdiction matters under investigation or prosecution, with 34 new cases made public, and 23 convictions entered (TRIAL International, 2026). Recent high-profile examples of universal or extra-territorial jurisdiction include the (re-)issuance of an arrest warrant against former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad by the French Court of Appeal on 29 July 2025, preceding his Syrian trial and sentencing in absentia in August 2026 (Granville and Davies, 2026). The 2024 Swiss Federal Criminal Court conviction of Ousman Sonko, former minister of the interior of the Gambia, was also a ‘landmark moment’ (Human Rights Watch, 2024). There are also a growing number of states outside Europe and the developed Commonwealth countries that have hosted or are undertaking universal jurisdiction litigation (Langer and Eason, 2019). In contrast to Australia, many states rely on the existence of independent, specialised, international crimes units within their states’ prosecutorial and investigatory bodies or lack laborious political approval processes for initiating these prosecutions.

Australia's Legislative Framework

Despite significant international disagreement regarding the scope of universal jurisdiction (Hovell, 2018), Australian legislative mechanisms enable absolute universality for torture and ‘atrocity crimes’ (United Nations, 2014), namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (Criminal Code Act ss 268.117, 274.2(5)). The law of the Commonwealth applies to these crimes, regardless of whether the conduct constituting the crime occurred in Australia (Criminal Code Act s 15.4).

No proceedings for atrocity crimes or torture can be commenced without the Attorney-General’s written consent (Criminal Code Act ss 268.121, 274.3); consent is separately and additionally required if the alleged criminal conduct occurs wholly in a foreign country, and the alleged offender is not Australian (Criminal Code Act s 16.1). The Attorney-General is not required to give reasons for giving or refusing consent to the prosecution of atrocity crimes, and decisions cannot be challenged (Criminal Code Act s 268.122). Whilst decisions to prosecute are ordinarily made by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (‘CDPP’), atrocity crimes are amongst the minority of Commonwealth offences that cannot be prosecuted without the consent of the Executive Government (see eg, Criminal Code Act ss 73.5 (people smuggling), 114.4 (state-sponsored terrorism), 115.5 (harming Australians)).  This creates a tension with the CDPP’s Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth (2021), which explicitly requires that decisions on whether to prosecute must clearly not be influenced by ‘possible political advantage, disadvantage or embarrassment to the Government or any political group or party’ (page 6).

Attorney-General's Consent as a Barrier to Prosecution

A frequent barrier to prosecution is a lack of consent by the Attorney-General. For example, out of the five requests made to the Attorney-General to commence prosecutions for atrocity crimes under division 268 of the Criminal Code Act, consent was likely only granted in the one case where universal jurisdiction was not needed as a jurisdictional basis for prosecution (Australian Centre for International Justice, 2024). 

In 2024, Senator Lydia Thorpe introduced the Criminal Code Amendment (Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes) Bill to the Australian Parliament. This sought to amend the Criminal Code Act to remove the requirement of the Attorney-General’s consent for proceedings relating to international crimes, by repealing sections 268.121–2 of the Criminal Code. Despite the majority of the 93 submissions from international law experts, civil society organisations and members of the public supporting the passage of the Bill, the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee recommended the Senate vote against the proposal (Green et al, 2024, 32–33). The significant disinclination to support universal jurisdiction prosecutions is illustrated through the following comment in the Committee’s conclusion:

‘Noting the only evidence received by the Committee of Attorneys-General declining consent to prosecute under section 268.121 relate to matters involving universal jurisdiction, it appears the provisions are working as intended.’

Australia's Investigative and Prosecutorial Process

Investigations into the commission of atrocity crimes and torture is undertaken by the AFP. The AFP (2024) recognises that:

‘The investigation and prosecution of offences in Division 268 of the Criminal Code present a range of challenges for investigators… many of which are exacerbated by the fact the investigation may require collection of evidence, access to victims, crime scenes and witnesses that are located outside of Australia.’

Historically, investigations for international crimes have been conducted by ad hoc, specialised units. For example, in 1987, a Special Investigations Unit (‘SIU’) was established to aid the domestic prosecution of Nazi war criminals seeking haven in Australia (Hanson, 2009). In 2021, the Office of the Special Investigator (‘OSI’) was established as an independent Executive Agency within the Attorney-General’s portfolio to investigate the Australian Defence Force’s alleged war crimes in Afghanistan (Order to Establish the Office of the Special Investigator as an Executive Agency, 2020).

Policy Options

A critical measure to gauge the success of Australia’s institutional framework for exercising universal jurisdiction would be the ratio of proceedings initiated to prosecute alleged perpetrators of international crimes, compared with the number of perpetrators reportedly present in Australia. The outcomes of the proceedings (resulting in convictions or acquittals) is not the object – rather, a genuine commitment to the pursuit of international criminal justice is required. The following policy solutions could assist in increasing the number of prosecutions:

Option 1: Amending the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) to replace the requirement for the Attorney-General’s consent to initiate universal jurisdiction atrocity crime or torture prosecutions with the CDPP’s consent

The Attorney-General’s unfettered discretion on whether to commence universal jurisdiction proceedings unduly politicises the prosecutorial process. This threatens to undermine both the legitimacy of decision-making in this area as well as Australia’s capacity to uphold its international obligations. This amendment would achieve depoliticisation and likely lead to a greater number of successful prosecutions. Simultaneously, this amendment appreciates the gravity of the offences in Division 268 and the difficulties of prosecuting through extended geographical jurisdiction. Thus, it introduces additional oversight by requiring the personal consent of the CDPP, in addition to the usual two-step test in the Commonwealth Prosecution Policy, requiring (i) sufficiency of evidence and (ii) evident public interest.

The CDPP is an independent actor that can ensure the decision to prosecute is free from political motivation and arbitrary application, whilst also ensuring there is no risk of vexatious prosecutions which lack sufficient evidentiary basis. There is strong precedent for federal prosecutors initiating international criminal proceedings overseas – for example, this is the model adopted by France and Germany, which currently have the highest number of universal jurisdiction prosecutions in the world (TRIAL International, 2026). This proposal is also unlikely to have any significant budgetary implications.

The difficulty with this proposal is that there is very limited political appetite for depoliticising universal jurisdiction prosecutions in Australia. Parliament had the opportunity to consider this proposal when submissions for Senator Thorpe’s 2024 Bill were received, however this was not explored further. Even in overseas jurisdictions where the federal prosecutor initiates proceedings, a high degree of control and oversight by the states’ respective executive governments is still reserved (Langer, 2011). 

Option 2: Amending the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 268.122 to introduce mandatory guidelines for the Attorney-General to follow when determining whether to initiate proceedings

Another method of depoliticising the prosecutorial process could be through introducing mandatory guidelines in the Criminal Code for when prosecutions should commence. This could introduce public interest considerations into the calculus, such as whether Australia has international law obligations to commence prosecution; the severity of the alleged international crime; the probability of success; the location, availability and sufficiency of evidence; anticipated cooperation with other countries; and double jeopardy. By providing a list of mandatory considerations which the Attorney-General must follow, as well as introducing irrelevant considerations which the Attorney-General must not consider (such as domestic political ramifications), an appropriate limit on political discretion could be introduced. The guidelines could also impose a requirement on the Attorney-General to provide written reasons for any decision to refuse consent, thus increasing the transparency of the process.

This proposal will have negligible budgetary implications and will likely aid in achieving the critical measure of success – if not an increase in the number of prosecutions, then at least an increase in the legitimacy of related decision-making. However, it will require compromising on the Attorney-General’s currently unfettered discretion; the Executive is unlikely to relinquish this control readily.   

Option 3: Creating a permanent specialised federal investigatory unit for international crimes

Australian investigation of international crimes has historically relied upon the establishment of ad hoc special investigation units. In the absence of such dedicated units or institutions, reliance on the AFP, which lacks the expertise or infrastructure to investigate international crimes, leads to the woefully inadequate outcomes discussed above. States with ongoing universal jurisdiction prosecutions, such as Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, the US and the UK, all have permanent, specialised units dedicated to the investigation of international crimes. Akin to these states, Australia can establish an independent Executive Agency within the Attorney-General’s portfolio, specialising in investigating international crimes under Divisions 268 and 274 of the Criminal Code Act. It can have the mandate of preventing alleged perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or torture from entering Australia, and investigating alleged perpetrators residing in Australia, leading to prosecution or immigration implications. Immediate legislative reform (and thus garnering majority political consensus) will not be necessary to enact this policy, however it will come at a considerable cost. Gauging from the 2026–27 total expenditure on the OSI ($47,519,000) (Australian Government, 2026, page 46), this Executive Agency will likely cost similarly, although can be staffed more efficiently.

Policy Recommendation

Option 3, ‘creating a permanent specialised federal investigatory unit for international crimes’ is recommended, as it is most likely to increase successful investigations and subsequent prosecutions of alleged international criminals present in Australia.

Rationale

Multiple barriers are currently preventing domestic prosecutions of international crimes. Yet it is worth bearing in mind that even before political consent to prosecution is required or sought, arrests and charges against alleged perpetrators of atrocity crimes and torture may be made. The absence of such arrests indicates that the policy gap is first institutional – current investigative agencies are unwilling or unable to catalyse the prosecutorial process.

Figure 1: See, for example, the Criminal Code Act s 268.121(3), providing that arrests for alleged offenders may precede the Attorney-General's consent to initiate proceedings.

Whilst the unsuccessful attempt at reforming the Criminal Code Act in 2024 significantly diminishes the prospects of the government re-introducing a similar bill soon (see Options 1 and 2), the establishment of the OSI in 2020 indicates recognition of the necessity of specialised institutional mechanisms for investigating international crimes. A permanent international crimes unit will increase Australian investigation and evidence-gathering capabilities, leading to higher prospects of the CDPP determining that prosecution is appropriate. This in turn will likely increase the number of prosecution requests submitted to (and likely consented by) the Attorney-General. Such a unit is essential not only for facilitating universal jurisdiction prosecutions, but also for having a permanent mechanism of investigating Australians accused of atrocity crimes, should future cases arise. This recommendation is also in line with Australian international criminal law experts and civil society groups’ consistent recommendation.

Implementation

Akin to the current OSI, the unit could be established as an independent Executive Agency within the Attorney-General’s portfolio, through an Executive Council order approved by the Governor-General under section 65 of the Public Service Act 1999. The objective of the unit should be to seek and obtain admissible evidence regarding alleged perpetration of international crimes, as defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and adopted in the Commonwealth Criminal Code. The objectives must be guided by a clear Australian policy directive on not affording impunity to alleged perpetrators of international crimes and achieving justice for victim-survivor communities.

The unit should be staffed by special agents, legal experts, criminal research specialists, historians, data analysts and financial analysts. Like the OSI, it can initially be staffed by investigators and analysts seconded from the Australian Federal Police and state police services, although maintaining independence from both services and increasing competence in this specialised investigative focus will be essential. Expertise should also be drawn from Australians who have worked in the various ad hoc and hybrid international criminal tribunals.   

Important stakeholders will include government departments (such as the Attorney-General’s Department, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Home Affairs and the CDPP), law enforcement agencies (such as the AFP and the Australian Border Force), victim-survivor communities and representative organisations, civil society groups, and Australian international criminal law academics. To fulfil obligations of mutual assistance in international criminal matters, interested states with territorial links to the alleged perpetrators will likely be important stakeholders, as well as victims and witnesses.

With a permanent mandate (unlike the SIU and the OSI), staffing and operational costs must be budgeted annually and perpetually. Gauging from the current annual cost of the OSI, this may be within the $40–50 million range. However, considering the OSI has 160 staff members, while overseas domestic investigative units have been highly effective with as little as 19 (Petit, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2014), the costing can be reduced significantly.

This unit could be established within three to four months, considering the OSI was established in less than two, although capabilities for the permanent unit will need to be continually strengthened.

Barriers and Risks

Establishing a permanent international crimes policy and institution challenges Australia’s history of sporadic engagement with international criminal justice. Both the SIU and the OSI were established as ad hoc measures after significant public and media outcry. Although the OSI is still in operation, the SIU was disbanded after five years, with only three prosecutions and no secured convictions (Boas and Chifflet, 2016). One of the biggest obstacles faced by the SIU was the unreliability or unavailability of evidence, considering decades had passed since the Nazi war crimes had occurred. This led to significant media criticism, funding cuts, and eventual disbandment. Establishing a specialised international crimes unit will require adequate resourcing and time to build expertise and retention of knowledge. Public awareness programs will need to be developed to garner recognition of the importance of these investigations (Baker et al, 2020).

International cooperation, joint investigation, and knowledge sharing will also be critical to ensure success. There are concerns that universal jurisdiction is exercised asymmetrically and only against alleged perpetrators from the Global South. Australia should not suddenly adopt a ‘global enforcer’ role in international criminal justice (Langer, 2015), or trial alleged perpetrators in absentia – this would risk raising significant diplomatic tensions and compromise Australia’s current international relations. Whilst retaining current Executive oversight to mitigate the identified diplomatic risks from prosecutions, Australia must ensure its institutional mechanisms for enforcing universal jurisdiction are independent of political vagaries and unbiased.

References

Australian Centre for International Justice. (2024). Submission 18 to the Criminal Code Amendment (Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes) Bill 2024. Parliament of Australia

Australian Federal Police. (2024). Best practice guide: Investigating war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. https://www.afp.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-08/BPG-investigating-war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-genocide.pdf

Australian Government. (2026). Budget Paper No. 4: Agency resourcing. https://budget.gov.au/content/bp4/index.htm

Baker, E., Hakki, L., Jacovides, J., Steinmetz, K., Stover, E., Tang, V., & Unser-Nad, F. (2020). Joining forces: National war crimes units and the pursuit of international justice.

Human Rights Quarterly, 42(3), 594–622. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.2020.0034

Boas, G., & Chifflet, P. (2016). Suspected war criminal in Australia: Law and policy. Melbourne University Law Review, 40.

Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. (2021, July 19). Prosecution policy of the Commonwealth. https://www.cdpp.gov.au/system/files/Prosecution%20Policy%20of%20the%20Commonwealth%20as%20updated%2019%20July%202021.pdf

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (n.d.). Australia on the United Nations Security Council. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/international-organisations/un/unsc/australia-on-the-united-nations-security-council

Doherty, B. (2024, February 28). Australia needs dedicated body to investigate people accused of international crimes like genocide, claim legal experts. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/feb/28/australia-needs-dedicated-body-to-investigate-people-accused-of-international-crimes-like-genocide-claim-legal-experts-ntwnfb

EUROJUST. (2022). Developments in the fight against impunity for core international crimes in the EU. https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/assets/developments-in-the-fight-against-impunity-for-core-international-crimes-in-the-eu.pdf

Fullilove, M. (Interviewer). (2022, March 17). Gareth Evans on good international citizenship [Audio podcast episode]. Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/conversations-gareth-evans-good-international-citizenship

Gawthorne. (2025, October). Statement to the United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (22nd meeting). United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/80/pdfs/statements/universal_jurisdiction/22mtg_canz.pdf

Granville, K., & Davies, L. (2026). Ousted Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad sentenced to death in absentia. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce34dkpnyg7o

Green et al. (2024). Report on the Criminal Code Amendment (Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes) Bill 2024. Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/reportsen/RB000356/toc_pdf/CriminalCodeAmendment(Genocide,CrimesAgainstHumanityandWarCrimes)Bill2024.pdf

Hall, M. G. (2023). Hostis humani generis: Universal jurisdiction in English criminal law and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in Ukraine. Cambridge Law Review, 8(2), 1–30.

Hanson, F. (2009, February). Confronting reality: Responding to war criminals living in Australia (Policy Brief). Lowy Institute.

Hovell, D. (2018). The authority of universal jurisdiction. European Journal of International Law, 29(2), 427–456. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chy037

Human Rights Watch. (2014, September 17). The long arm of justice: Lessons from specialized war crimes units in France, Germany, and the United States. https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/17/long-arm-justice/lessons-specialized-war-crimes-units-france-germany-and

Human Rights Watch. (2024, May 15). Gambia: Landmark Swiss conviction of ex-official. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/15/gambia-landmark-swiss-conviction-ex-official

International Centre for Transitional Justice. (2022). Specialized war crimes units [Report]. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/202203/ICTJ_Report_Specialized_Units_Web.pdf

International Committee of the Red Cross. (n.d.). Rule 158: Prosecution of war crimes. In Customary IHL database. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule158

Keene-McCann, J., & Jayakody, A. (2025, October 13). Australia’s role in bringing international criminals to justice. The Interpreter (Lowy Institute). https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australia-s-role-bringing-international-criminals-justice

Lagerwall, A., & Hébert-Dolbec, M.-L. (2022). Universal jurisdiction. In Max Planck encyclopedias of international law. Oxford University Press. https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeipro/e2259.013.2259/law-mpeipro-e2259

Langer, M. (2011). Diplomacy of universal jurisdiction: The political branches and the transnational prosecution of international crimes. American Journal of International Law, 105(1), 1–49. doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.105.1.0001

Langer, M. (2015). Universal jurisdiction is not disappearing: The shift from “global enforcer” to “no safe haven” universal jurisdiction. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 13(2), 245–256. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqv009

Langer, M., & Eason, M. (2019). The quiet expansion of universal jurisdiction. European Journal of International Law, 30(3), 779–817. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chz050

Office of the Special Investigator. (2020). Order to establish the Office of the Special Investigator as an Executive Agency. Federal Register of Legislation. https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2020G01030/latest/text

Petit, F. (2018, December 17). International crimes: Spotlight on France’s war crimes unit. JusticeInfo.net. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/39791-international-crimes-spotlight-on-france-s-war-crimes-unit.html

Russell. (2024, October). Statement to the United Nations General Assembly Sixth Committee (14th meeting). United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/79/pdfs/statements/universal_jurisdiction/14mtg_canz.pdf

TRIAL International. (2026). Universal Jurisdiction Annual Review 2026. https://trialinternational.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/UJAR_2026_digital.pdf

United Nations General Assembly. (2006). Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law (A/RES/60/147).

United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. (2014). Framework of analysis for atrocity crimes: A tool for prevention. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/about-us/Doc.3_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf

Legislation and Treaties

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987).

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951).

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).

Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950).

International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth).

International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 (Cth).

Public Service Act 1999 (Cth).

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002).

The views and opinions expressed by Global Voices Fellows do not necessarily reflect those of the organisation or its staff.