Australian Climate Mobility Governance in the Indo-Pacific: Bridging the legal and policy gap

Isha Desai, Global Voices Fellow, Y20

Executive Summary

Climate migration lacks a universal definition in international law and a coordinated policy approach in the global community. This impacts populations suffering from climate-induced displacement, who are left with no secure legal status. This means they are vulnerable to being forced to return to unsafe areas, economic exploitation and having their visa denied. 

This is especially urgent in the Indo-Pacific, where low-lying islands face imminent extinction from rising sea levels and intense natural disasters. 90 million people in the region are at risk of climate-induced displacement (Clayton, 2023). Without action, these displaced individuals are at risk of discrimination, exploitation and trafficking. As such, climate instability across the Indo-Pacific could upend regional security. Australia should take climate-induced displacement seriously to maintain positive relationships in the region. This will increase trust in Australia’s diplomacy, ultimately cultivating long-term humanitarian partnerships.   

It is recommended that the Australian Government ‘introduce a climate migration subclass to the Migration Act 1958’ to protect climate displaced communities and ensure their migration options are dignified and rights based. This policy change ensures that climate refugees are recognised under Australian law. A trial cap of 500 visas annually could be tested as a pilot program for this legislative change, costing approximately $1.3 million per year. This policy could be hindered by its administrative burden on the Australian Government, specifically the Department of Home Affairs, in creating and subsequently managing a new migration subclass. Ultimately, it is the first step to building a culture that considers climate displacement as a legitimate security threat and establishes a dignified and rights-based approach to climate-induced migration.

Problem Identification

The Indo-Pacific is at risk of substantial climate displacement. The region is expected to experience the consequences of environmental factors exacerbated by climate change, including extreme weather and rising sea levels (Watson et al., 2023). A 2023 NASA assessment forecasts that 95% of Tuvalu’s land will be underwater by 2100 (NASA et al., 2023), and that other states in the region are likely to experience the same fate (Ward, 2025). Additionally, ODI Global (Gaviria Betancur, 2024) notes that the loss of legal protection increases the risk of gender based violence, social isolation, family separation and mental health issues.

Despite this, climate-affected populations lack a secure legal status and climate migration does not have a universal definition under international law. A person fleeing prosecution due to their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or social group is protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol which establishes their rights. These establish that states cannot return refugees to countries where their life is in danger (non-refoulement), states cannot penalise refugees for illegal entry if they have a justified cause and refugees have access to work, education and housing (UNHCR, 2026). Importantly, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not account for slow onset events such as drought or sea level rise as a cause for refugee status. Additionally, UN Human Rights Law does not give legal rights for civilians vulnerable to climate impacts (Lengkong, 2025). As a result, it creates a legal gap where domestic policy responses do not set refugee, asylum or visa frameworks for displaced communities who thus have no enforceable right to move or rebuild their lives.   

Ultimately, this problem concerns Australians as climate instability amongst our allies will upend regional security. Australia’s future is ‘irrevocably tied’ (Department of Defence, 2013) to the sustainability of the Indo-Pacific. These ties include Australia’s role as a founding member of the Pacific Island Forum, Australia’s International Development Policy (DFAT, 2023), maritime defence activities in the Pacific Ocean and educational exchange programs. In addition, Australia is home to over 400,000 Pasifika people with deep cultural ties to the region (Gerace et al., 2023). To continue being a reliable ally and maintain positive relationships with Indo-Pacific states including Tuvalu, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands and more, Australia must take their climate needs seriously.

Context

Background

The impact of climate change includes rising sea levels, coastal erosion and storm surges. This threatens the habitability and existence of low-lying islands. The compounding effects of climate change will see an increase in communities migrating to safer and secure land. Small Island Developing States (SIDS) such as Fiji, Tonga and Tuvalu will experience the largest disaster displacement relative to their population (Rigaud et al., 2018). Thus, climate mobility will escalate. 

Climate mobility is a term used to encompass the range of movements that arise from the impacts of climate change (Gamboa & Goh, 2025a). These include:

1. Climate migration, an autonomous movement within or across borders

2. Climate displacement, the forced movement of people driven by acute environmental impacts

3. Planned relocation, the process of moving individuals because their land becomes uninhabitable

Existing responses to climate mobility from local, national and international stakeholders lack coordination and a holistic approach (Hahn & Fessler, 2023). These responses are failing because each stakeholder conceives the problem differently and, as a result, only addresses the aspects of climate mobility that affect them. For example, local communities in Kiribati prioritise sovereignty and ‘mobility with dignity’ (McNamara, 2015) whilst Kiribati’s national responses focus on in-situ adaptation such as raising the land (UNSW Kaldor Centre, 2026). This shows that groups perceive and tackle climate displacement differently. This hinders the potential for comprehensive and sustainable solutions. 

Climate mobility governance is barely addressed through multilateral agreements, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or Global Compact for Migration.  This means the burden of climate mobility policies fall to alternative forums or civil society groups with reduced resources and stakeholders, such as the Platform on Disaster Displacement or the International Organisation for Migration (Zickgraf, 2021).

Current Policy Landscape

Australia already holds the leading example of international policy addressing cross-border climate migration. This is found in the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty (DFAT, 2024). As part of this treaty, the Australian Government committed to providing 280 visas a year for Tuvaluans to live, work or study in Australia. This closes a protection gap for a climate displaced community that is not recognised as a refugee group in international law. Instead, Australia’s treaty marks the first climate mobility visa in the world. 

The outcome of this recent treaty has not been fully realised. In its first application round, over one-third of all Tuvaluans applied for the visa (Gamboa & Goh, 2025b). It has been critiqued for failing to provide ongoing support to integrate into Australian society (Gamboa & Goh, 2025b). However, without restrictions on age or disability, it fosters a rights-based approach to address climate mobility. As this is the only domestic policy addressing climate migration, a gap exists where Australia can develop more detailed and substantial policies to address this issue in the region. Australia has the opportunity to act as an innovator for international climate migration, positively influencing the global community.

The primary visa for Indo-Pacific populations to reside in Australia is the Pacific Engagement visa. This visa aims to foster cultural, business and educational exchange (DFAT, 2025). Up to 3,000 visas are provided annually through a ballot system. Eligibility includes an age range of 18-45, a valid passport from the Pacific and Timor-Leste diaspora and a $25 registration fee.

The other visa for vulnerable Indo-Pacific populations is the Australian Protection visa subclass 866. However, to qualify for this visa individuals must meet the requirements to be a refugee. These include a risk of persecution due to an individual’s race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a social group (Home Affairs, 2026a). As such, climate-displaced peoples are not addressed in Australia’s humanitarian visa structures. There is an opportunity to further build upon the legal gap for climate displaced people in the Indo Pacific and establish a larger humanitarian pathway.

Case Studies

Few case studies addressing climate-induced migration exist in the global community, and they have limited success in providing robust options for climate displaced communities. 

Internationally, East Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development has established the free movement protocol. This enables climate displaced people to enter other member states and relocate if returning to their home country is not feasible (Huang, 2023). This protocol closes a protection gap for climate displaced people who do not qualify as refugees in international law. It enables displaced people to work, study and integrate into other communities when their country is unlivable. It fosters more self-reliance and reduces their complete dependency on aid providers. However, this protocol remains partially implemented across the region, with five states having signed but not ratified the protocol (IGAD, 2024). In addition, it does not explicitly name climate migrants as an eligible group, but rather justifies their right of free movement through a general term: ‘other vulnerable groups’ (Amadi & Vundamina, 2025). Despite this, it is still considered an innovative step in protecting climate displaced communities (Wood, 2020).

New Zealand also facilitates a Pacific Access Category (PAC) lottery with 650 spots a year for Kiribati, Tonga, Tuvalu and Fiji citizens to permanently migrate. This visa targets citizens of low-lying Indo Pacific islands, yet requires applicants to have secured employment and the ability to read, write and speak English (Immigration New Zealand, 2026). As such, its effectiveness is limited in targeting climate displaced people in the Indo-Pacific.

Policy Options

Critical Measures of Success

The critical measure of success for a policy response is that Indo-Pacific populations living under uninhabitable climate conditions have legal protection of their status in national policies. This will be achieved when vulnerable communities can apply for climate mobility programs under distinct, robust parameters that prioritise their safety, wellbeing and long-term security. The indicators to ensure success are: 

1. Climate refugees will have a valid legal status in Australian law 

2. Climate refugees will be eligible for inclusive migration options

Option 1: Add a climate migration subclass in the Migration Act 1958 to establish a legal foundation for climate-induced refugees to apply for a visa

Building upon the Australia Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty, Australia should add a climate migration subclass in the Migration Act 1958. Under this subclass, uninhabitable rapid existential climate conditions such as sea level rise, land erosion and ongoing natural disaster will be considered a ‘real risk of significant harm’. Thus, individuals can apply under a refugee status for an Australian visa in the new climate migration subclass. A trial cap of 500 visas annually could be implemented under this subclass, with subsequent monitoring and evaluation for effectiveness. 

Adding an additional 500 climate visas into the Australian migration system would cost approximately $1.3 million per year. This option closes the legal gap by providing a distinct definition and subclass for climate-displaced people to seek protection. Potential cons include the administrative burden to Home Affairs, and managing the needs and risk of climate change in the Indo Pacific against Australia’s capacity for quality migration.

Option 2: Amend Migration Regulations 1994 Schedule 2 eligibility criteria to recognise cumulative indicators of climate displacement for a Protection Visa and Pacific Engagement Visas  

This policy proposes expanding criteria for selected visas to include proxy indicators such as coastal erosion, salination and rainfall decline as admissible evidence of climate displacement for visa applications. This policy would only apply to Indo Pacific populations applying for the Pacific Engagement visa and its subclasses (e.g 192 - Tuvalu) or the Protection visa subclass 866 (a permanent residency for individuals who are at risk of significant harm in their home country) (Home Affairs, 2026b). This policy addresses the critical measure by ensuring that the real experiences of climate-affected Indo Pacific communities will be admissible as evidence for visa applications. The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC, 2019) has estimated that the act of developing and administering new internal criteria would cost $3 million per year.

This expansion in visa eligibility criteria will align Australia’s policy with climate science, creating accurate and transparent reform whilst strengthening our role as an ally in the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, changing standards itself is a low-cost, high impact signal to the community that our state is committed to protecting climate displaced populations. However, it also may result in an increase in workload for Home Affairs, which could cause slower processing times. Interpreting evidentiary data on climate change could cause challenges in consistency and uneven implementation. 

Option 3: The Australian Government should formally recognise statehood of countries that become uninhabitable due to climate change

In 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion that the disappearance of land mass and population does not automatically terminate statehood. Instead, state sovereignty persists when international legal personality is maintained. The ICJ outlined that ‘states must work together…to achieve equitable solutions’ (Newton & Griffin, 2025). Australia should maintain formal diplomatic recognition for states deteriorating under climate change. In practice, The Australian Prime Minister or Foreign Minister would be responsible for delivering a statement outlining Australia’s categorisation of climate impacted nations such as Tuvalu and Kiribati. No legislative change would be required to make this statement as statehood can be recognised through diplomatic mechanisms. 

This addresses the critical measure of success by creating a governance process embedded in dignity, where their home country and government will be treated as a legitimate state in international diplomacy following the loss of land mass. Diplomatic recognition of statehood is a ‘virtually cost-free’ act that would signal legitimacy of deteriorating states (Kattan, 2023). The benefits of this policy include maintaining recognition of other states’ sovereignty, with pathways for climate-affected populations to maintain citizenship from their home country (Caligiuri, 2022). However, this policy also highlights a lack of certainty and precedent for climate-affected states, potentially creating complicated legal disputes.

Policy Recommendation

Option 1, to ‘introduce a climate migration subclass to the Migration Act 1958’, is recommended at the first step towards protecting climate displaced communities and ensuring their migration options are dignified and rights based. This policy is recommended because it acts as a precursor for the other two options. A climate migration subclass can become the foundation for the Australian Government to accept cumulative indicators of climate change in visa applications and recognise the statehood of deteriorating states. It also offers the advantage of being the most progressive proposal in furthering the rights of climate-displaced populations. 

To implement this, Home Affairs should draft a legislative amendment that includes a synopsis of the visa subclass, eligibility criteria, visa deliverables and application requirements. A climate migration subclass would come under the Pacific Engagement visa. Indo Pacific citizens that are experiencing severe, irreversible climate deterioration to their environment that impedes their ability to work, study or live would be eligible to apply. A trial cap of 500 visas could be tested as a pilot program for this legislative change. Home Affairs would be responsible for monitoring and evaluating applications, administering the regular operation of the new subclass.

In the 2025-26 budget, $534.5 million was assigned to visa processing for that year. This corresponds to a migration cap of 260,000 people (BDO, 2025). $534.5 million for 260,000 people means that the administrative cost per migration is approx. $2,056. However, migrants applying for specialised streams, such as a climate visa could incur an increase in administrative costs, totalling up to $2,600 each. As such, 500 visas would cost approximately $1.3 million per year, less than 0.3% of annual visa processing funds. To address this cost,  Home Affairs could absorb the cost of a climate mobility pilot program into their larger budget and recover a portion of the costs through the application fee for the climate visa. Ultimately, early intervention into humanitarian responses can reduce costs associated with emergency and disaster response in the future.

Success for this policy would be measured by tracking annual visa applications, acceptances and evaluation surveys for Indo Pacific individuals who have migrated to Australia under a climate mobility visa. After one year living in Australia, recipients of the visa will be given a survey to evaluate their experience of moving to Australia from climate induced factors. The survey will cover topics such as physical and mental health, ability to find work, financial support, housing, community engagement and life satisfaction. These results will be analysed by Home Affairs staff to indicate the success of introducing a climate mobility pathway to Australia.

Barriers and Risks

This policy could be hindered by an increase in institutional and administrative burdens relating to legislative changes. This includes establishing Home Affairs’ policy on climate migration visas, monitoring and evaluation. Adding a new subclass would require specialised policy design and capacity building within Home Affairs to avoid uncertainty during visa processing (PM&C, 2022). High volumes of applications could also result in visa processing delays and structural bottlenecks in the migration system (Parliament of Australia, 2024). This can be mitigated by using the same administrative processes as subclass 192 (Tuvalu stream) in the Pacific Engagement Visa (Home Affairs, 2026). 

A risk to this policy is the uncertainty of the future of climate mobility. Climate migration lacks a consensus definition in international law and comparative contexts, as it is navigated on a case-by-case basis (Pérez-Segura et al., 2025). Whilst Australia must plan for the security of its region, it is highly likely that the multifaceted nature of climate change will create scenarios that the Australian Government has not prepared for, such as large-scale natural disaster and sudden displacement. This will require iterative amendments to policy (Huang, 2023). Despite this, it is important that federal policy begins to consider how it will equip itself to manage large-scale climate mobility and displacement.

Another risk to creating a climate migration visa subclass is Australia’s increasing social and community resistance towards migration. A survey conducted by Roy Morgan (2025) found that 13% of Australian voters believe that ‘managing immigration’ is a high priority issue. The increasing polarisation and anti-migration sentiment is a risk for administrations that want to support regional climate mobility, for fear of public backlash.

References

Amadi, VT & Vundamina, MND (2025) Climate-induced migration in Africa: How can the law enable free movement?, African Climate Wire https://africanclimatewire.org/2025/03/climate-induced-migration-in-africa-how-can-the-law-enable-free-movement/ 

Australian Government (Cth) (1994) Migration Regulations 1994, regulation 3. https://www.legislation.gov.au/F1996B03551/latest/text/3

BDO (2025) Migration and the Federal Budget: A case of missing numbers? https://www.bdo.com.au/en-au/insights/budget/2025/migration-and-the-federal-budget-a-case-of-missing-numbers

Caligiuri, A. (2022) Sinking states: The statehood dilemma in the face of sea-level rise. Questions of International Law (QIL). https://www.qil-qdi.org/sinking-states-the-statehood-dilemma-in-the-face-of-sea-level-rise/

Clayton, K. (2023) ‘An insecure future: Climate change-related disaster management in the Indo-Pacific’, Perth USAsia Centre, November. https://perthusasia.edu.au/research-insights/an-insecure-future-climate-change-related-disaster-management-in-the-indo-pacific/

Department of Defence. (2013) Defence White Paper 2013. Australian Government

https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/defence-white-paper

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (2023) Australia’s International Development Policy Australian Government https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/development/australias-international-development-policy 

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (2024)  Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty, Australian Government https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-treaty 

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) (2025) Pacific Engagement Visa. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/people-connections/people-connections-in-the-pacific/pacific-engagement-visa

Department of Home Affairs (2026a) Protection visas are for asylum seekers. https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/protection-866/genuine-asylum-seekers

Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) (2026b) Pacific Engagement visa (subclass 192) – Treaty stream (Tuvalu). Australian Government https://immi.homeaffairs.gov.au/visas/getting-a-visa/visa-listing/pacific-engagement/subclass-192-treaty-stream

​​Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) (2022) A migration system for Australia’s future: Discussion Paper, November 2022. Canberra: Australian Government. https://oia.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/posts/2024/01/A%20migration%20system%20for%20Australias%20future%20Discussion%20Paper%20November%202022.pdf

Federal Register of Legislation. (2026) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1958A00062/latest/text

Federal Register of Legislation (2025) Supply Act (No. 1) 2025-2026 (Cth) (2025) https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2025A00019/asmade/2025-03-27/text

Gamboa, L. & Goh, D. (2025a) ‘What Is Climate Mobility, and Why Should We Care?’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 18 June 2025 https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/research/2025/06/what-is-climate-mobility-and-why-should-we-care 

Gamboa, L & Goh, D (2025b) Australia–Tuvalu Falepili Union: The first bilateral climate mobility treaty, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union-the-first-bilateral-climate-mobility-treaty?lang=en 

Gaviria Betancur, P. (2024) Shining a light on the human rights challenges of Internally Displaced Persons. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI). https://odi.org/en/insights/shining-light-human-rights-challenges-idps/

Gerace, G., Itaoui, R., Moors-Mailei, A,. Williams, B., Patu, P., & Ponton, V. (2023). Pasifika communities in Australia: 2021 Census. Centre for Western Sydney. https://doi.org/10.26183/9qbb-cy24 

Hahn, H & Fessler, M (2023) ‘The EU’s approach to climate mobility: Which way forward?’ European Migration and Diversity Programme, Sustainable Prosperity for Europe Programme, European Policy Centre, 26 October

Huang, L. (2023) Climate Migration 101: An Explainer. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/climate-migration-101-explainer

Immigration New Zealand (2026) Pacific Access Category Resident Visa, New Zealand Government https://www.immigration.govt.nz/visas/pacific-access-category-resident-visa/ 

Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 2024, Kenya signs the IGAD Free Movement of Persons Protocol, IGAD, 7 June https://igad.int/kenya-signs-the-igad-free-movement-of-persons-protocol/

Jolly, S., Ahmad, N. & Scott, M. (2024) Climate-Related Human Mobility in Asia and the Pacific: Interdisciplinary Rights-Based Approaches. Sustainable Development Goals Series, Springer Singapore

Kattan, V. (2023) There is no legal impediment to Australia’s recognition of Palestine. ABC Religion & Ethics, 2 August. https://www.abc.net.au/religion/no-legal-impediment-to-australian-recognition-of-palestine/102679696

Lengkong, C.Y. (2025) ‘Toward a regional legal framework for climate-induced migration in Southeast Asia: Lessons from Indonesia and the ASEAN response gap’, Michigan State Law Review, 2025/2026

McNamara, K.E. 2015, Cross-border migration with dignity in Kiribati, Forced Migration Review, vol. 49, pp. 62–62, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford https://www.fmreview.org/climatechange-disasters/mcnamara/

NASA Sea Level Change Team, Adams, K., Blackwood, C., Cullather, R., Heijkoop, E., Hamlington, B., Karnauskas, K., Kopp, R., Larour, E., Lee, T., Nerem, R.S., Nowicki, S., Piecuch, C.G., Ray, R., Rounce, D., Thompson, P., Vinogradova, N., Wang, O. & Willis, M. (2023) Assessment of Sea Level Rise and Associated Impacts for Tuvalu, N-SLCT-2023-01 Technical Report, Zenodo. https://zenodo.org/records/8069320

National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) (2019) Project planning. https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/guidelinesforguidelines/plan/project-planning

Newton, S.K. and Griffin, B. (2025) Sea-level rise & international law: ICJ advisory opinion on climate change, a watershed moment. ITA in Review, 7(2). https://itainreview.org/articles/2025/Vol7/Issue2/sea-level-rise--international-law-the-icj-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-a-watershed-moment.html

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Organisation for Refugees, Asylum-seekers and Stateless Persons (2026) Asylum and refugee status.: https://help.unhcr.org/global/asylum-and-refugee-status/

Parliament of Australia (Joint Committee on Migration) (2024) Chapter 6 – Reducing complexities and costs, improving processing times and transparency, in Migration, pathway to nation building: Report. Canberra: Parliament of Australia. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Migration/MigrationPathway/Report/Chapter_6_-_Reducing_Complexities_and_Costs_Improving_Processing_Times_and_Transparency

Pérez-Segura, V., Caro-Carretero, R. & Rua, A. (2025) ‘The elusive climate migrant: symbolic geographies in migration studies’, Comparative Migration Studies, 13(1), Page 1–18. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40878-025-00489-1

Stanley, S.K., Leviston, Z. & Ng Tseung-Wong, C. (2023) ‘Support for climate-driven migration in Australia: Testing an ideology-based threat model’, Current Research in Ecological and Social Psychology, 4, 100119. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666622723000321

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (no date), Human Mobility, including Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation https://unfccc.int/fr/node/285 

United Nations (1999) Convention on Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the Seventh International Conference of American States, signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933. In: United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1761. https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210596800s003-c002

United Nations (2026) Global Compact for Migration. https://www.un.org/en/migration2022/global-compact-for-migration

UNSW Kaldor Centre (2026), Staying in place, Climate Mobility Hub, University of New South Wales https://climatemobility.unsw.edu.au/staying-in-place

Rigaud, K.K., de Sherbinin, A., Jones, B., Bergmann, J., Clement, V., Ober, K., Schewe, J., Adamo, S., McCusker, B., Heuser, S. & Midgley, A. (2018) Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2018/03/19/groundswell---preparing-for-internal-climate-migration

Roy Morgan (2025) Migration concerns surge ‘post-pandemic’ – almost returning to pre-pandemic levels. https://www.roymorgan.com/findings/10021-australian-perceptions-of-immigration-september-2025

Ward, S. (2025) Lost at sea: How Tuvalu’s plight holds lessons for the future, Lowy Institute The Interpreter, 23 June. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/lost-sea-how-tuvalu-s-plight-holds-lessons-future

Watson, T., Lenton, T. M. & de Campos, R. S. (2023) ‘The climate change, conflict and migration nexus: A holistic view’ Climate Resilience and Sustainability, 2(2), e250. https://doi.org/10.1002/cli2.50

Wood, T (2020) New pact paves way for innovative solutions to disaster and climate change displacement in Africa, Platform on Disaster Displacement https://disasterdisplacement.org/perspectives/new-pact-paves-way-for-innovative-solutions-to-disaster-and-climate-change-displacement-in-africa/ 

Zickgraf, C. (2021) ‘Stifling silos: The need for a more holistic approach to mixed migration in a warming world’, in Mixed Migration Review 2021. Mixed Migration Centre. https://mixedmigration.org/publications/mmr/2021/stifling-silos-the-need-for-a-more-holistic-approach-to-mixed-migration-in-a-warming-world/

The views and opinions expressed by Global Voices Fellows do not necessarily reflect those of the organisation or its staff.